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This thesis examines the elasticity of employment and wages to changes in the minimum wage 
and the incidence of the costs of these changes between consumers and firm owners, using firm-
level financial information linked to longitudinal employer-employee data from Portugal 
between 2008 and 2017. It exploits differences in firm exposure to changes in the minimum 
wage to uncover the sensitivity of employment and wages to this policy and the main margins 
of adjustment of firms. It finds that more exposed firms experience higher growth in average 
wage and a larger decline in employment. The employment elasticities with respect to average 
wages range from -0.48 to -0.56 over 2008–17. Subperiod analysis shows that the employment 
elasticity varies considerably, with the increases in the minimum wage resulting in larger 
negative effects on employment during the crisis period of 2010 to 2014, when firms were 
arguably less able to transfer the burden to consumers in the form of higher prices. During this 
period, the employment elasticity was -0.77. In terms of incidence, during the period of positive 
growth (2008–09), the increase in the margin between revenues and materials suggests that 
most of the costs of the minimum wage increases were borne by consumers. In the subsequent 
periods, the majority of the minimum wage costs was borne by firm owners, as firms suffer a 
decrease in profits that offset the increase in labor costs caused by the higher minimum wage. 
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Esta tese analisa as elasticidades do emprego e salários a mudanças no salário mínimo e a sua 
incidência nos consumidores e empresários em Portugal entre 2008 e 2017. Através de uma 
base de dados longitudinal que combina informação de trabalhadores e empresas, esta tese 
explora as diferenças na exposição das empresas a um aumento do salário mínimo para estimar 
os efeitos deste no emprego, salários e nas principais margens das empresas. Os resultados 
indicam que empresas com maior exposição registam maior crescimento no salário médio e um 
declínio mais acentuado no emprego. As estimativas para a elasticidade do emprego relativa ao 
salário médio variam entre -0.48 e -0.56 para o período 2008-17. A análise de vários períodos 
mostra que estas elasticidades variam consideravelmente, sendo que o aumento do salário 
mínimo foi mais prejudicial para o emprego no período de crise 2010-14. Quando as empresas 
estavam menos aptas a transferir os custos do salário mínimo para os consumidores através de 
preços mais altos. Durante este período, a elasticidade do empego foi -0.77. Em termos de 
incidência, durante o período de crescimento económico 2008-09, o aumento das margens das 
empresas indica que a maioria dos custos do salário mínimo foram suportados pelos 
consumidores. Nos períodos seguintes, a maioria dos custos do salário mínimo foram suportado 
pelos empresários, sendo que a redução registada nos lucros compensou o aumento dos gastos 
com pessoal causados pelo aumento do salário mínimo. 
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A large body of research studies the empirical effects of changes in the minimum wage 
on labour market outcomes and who bears the costs of these changes between consumers and 
firm owners. The results (on the magnitudes and direction) are mixed. Stigler (1946) and 
Neumark and Wascher (2010) find that raising the minimum wage has negative effects on 
employment, particularly among low-skilled workers. In contrast, Card and Krueger (1992, 
1995) and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010) find insignificant or even positive effects. In a recent 
meta-analysis, Wolfson and Belman (2019) conclude that the effects of increases in the 
minimum wage on employment are small and potentially non-existent. The results on the 
incidence of the minimum wage between consumers and firm owners are also controversial. 
Card and Krueger (1995) and Aaronson and French (2007) find that consumers are the ultimate 
payers of the minimum wage through higher output prices. In contrast, Draca, Machin, and Van 
Reenen (2011) find that firm owners bear most of the burden in the form of lower profits.  
A number of theoretical explanations for such effects have been advanced. Neoclassical 
models emphasize that an increase in the minimum wage generates unemployment, especially 
among low-wage workers. In a competitive labor market with homogeneous workers, 
equilibrium wage and employment are obtained by the intersection of the demand and supply 
curves. The employers minimize costs and choose the amount of labor input that sets the 
marginal product of a worker equal to the marginal cost, that is, the wage. When a minimum 
wage is imposed above the equilibrium wage, employers need to adjust to ensure cost 
minimization. Firms are forced to reduce the number of employees or working hours, as the 
marginal product of labor is inferior to its marginal cost (the minimum wage). Alternatively, 
employers can increase labor productivity by investing in other factors of production and/or 
changing the production techniques. This compelling and simple argument suggests that 
workers bear, at least in part, the costs of minimum wage policies. In contrast, in the monopsony 
case, the employer enjoys a certain degree of market power, and the imposition of a minimum 
wage between the monopsonistic wage and the competitive wage can improve employment 
(Gilroy and Kohen, 1982). 
In this thesis, I present new evidence on the employment and wage elasticities to the 
minimum wage and the incidence of the costs between workers and firms by exploiting 
increases in the minimum wage in Portugal and the various margins of adjustment of firms. I 
use a rich combination of firm-level financial information linked to longitudinal employer-
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employee data from Social Security records between 2007 and 2017. During this period, the 
minimum wage grew approximately 23% in real terms and 38% in nominal terms in Portugal. 
Rather than focusing on the aggregate effects across regions, this thesis focuses on the unequal 
distribution of effects across firms. It assesses elasticities and incidence, pairing the firm-shock 
that the minimum wage change implies and firms’ reactions. Specifically, firms with more 
workers affected by the minimum wage increase are likely to suffer more than those firms with 
fewer affected workers. This thesis estimates a panel regression based on the year-to-year firm-
level relationship between the fraction of workers who earned below the new minimum wage 
in the year before the change and the percentage change in the outcome of interest during that 
year. The results show that there is a negative effect on employment resulting from the increase 
in the minimum wage and a larger positive effect on firms’ average wage. Employment 
elasticities range between -0.48 and -0.56. The analysis of a 10-year time span also allows for 
uncovering how the relative magnitudes of these effects (elasticities) changed over time. 
Employment was particularly sensitive to changes in the minimum wage during the crisis period 
of 2010 to 2014, when firms arguably were less able to transfer the burden to consumers in the 
form of higher prices, rather than in the positive growth periods that preceded and followed it. 
In terms of incidence, I find that during the period of positive growth (2008–09), most of the 
cost of the minimum wage increase was borne by consumers. Yet, during the crisis period, the 
majority of the minimum wage costs was borne by firm owners, and this occurred because they 
suffered a decrease in profits due to the increase in labor costs, which were caused by the higher 
minimum wage. In particular, during that period, the lion share of the increased cost of labor 
was covered by lower profits, while the remaining was paid by consumers in the form of higher 
revenue. 
This thesis is perhaps most closely related to a recent study by Harasztosi and Lindner 
(2019). Using Hungarian data, the authors show that the 60% raise in the Hungarian minimum 
wage in real terms in 2001 led to negative, but small, employment effects that were observed 
even four years after the reform. Around 75% of the minimum wage increase was paid by 
consumers and 25% by firm owners. In this thesis, the results for the period of positive growth 
are consistent with those of Harasztosi and Lindner (2019). As expected, the results differ in 
magnitude and are larger in the case of Hungary, given the size and nature of the policy reform.1  
 
1 Other papers have estimated the employment elasticities of the minimum wage using different methodologies. 
In particular, Centeno, Duarte e Novo (2013) estimate cross-sections of worker-level effects focusing on how they 
differ throughout the worker position on the wage distribution for the years of 2003 to 2010 using data from 
Portugal. Using a similar methodology Abowd et al. (2000) estimates these elasticities for France. For the US, 
DiNardo et al. (1996) used a semiparametric procedure to analyse the effect of the minimum wage over the entire 
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Yet, the incidence results during the crisis subperiod are different and open important avenues 
for future research. Relative to Harasztosi and Lindner’s (2019) paper, the main advantage of 
the current thesis is that countries rarely do one-time increases in this magnitude of the 
minimum wage, but rather they impose year-to-year progressive increases, as in Portugal. 
Firms’ reactions to a one-time large change are arguably different from their reactions to 
progressive changes. Moreover, their reactions will depend on factor-market institutions (e.g., 
collective bargaining, or fair/efficiency wages, which may be particularly relevant in Portugal), 
but also on the overall performance of the economy. The fact that in the Portuguese case the 
period under analysis covers crisis and non-crisis years helps to strengthen the argument that 
the minimum wage–employment relationship largely depends on rent sharing between firms 
and workers and the ability of firms to increase output prices. Overall, however, my findings 
remain consistent with the broader argument in Harasztosi and Lindner (2019) but bring 
additional insights on the incidence of the minimum wage increase between firms and workers 
and highlight the importance of differencing elasticities of employment to minimum wage 
changes in good and bad times.  
The thesis proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of the minimum wage 
in Portugal during the period of the analysis. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 describes 
the empirical methodology. Sections 5 and 6 present the evidence on the employment and wage 
effects of the minimum wage and the various margins of adjustment by firms. Section 7 explore 
further robustness checks and threats to identification. And section 8 concludes. 
2. Institutional Context: Evolution of the Minimum 
Wage  
 
The Minimum Wage policy (or Retribuição Mínima Mensal Garantida – RMMG) was 
introduced in 1974 in Portugal and, since then, has undergone many adjustments. By law, the 
nominal minimum wage is revised on an annual basis. It is determined by considering, amongst 
other factors, the evolution of the cost of living and productivity. The minimum wage is set per 
month and has a 40 hours/week reference, corresponding to a full-time job in Portugal. Figure 
1 presents the evolution of the minimum wage in real terms in Portugal over 2007–17. 
 
wage distribution between 1973 and 1979 in the US. Despite the differences in methodology, this thesis’ elasticity 
estimates for the period of positive growth in Portugal are in line with their findings. In terms of magnitude, they 
are similar to those obtained in Portugal and the US and smaller than the one obtained for France, a country with 
a high minimum wage. 
 4 
During 2007–17, the minimum wage was revised on seven occasions (every year except 
2012, 2013, and 2015). During this period, the nominal minimum wage grew approximately 
38.21%, from €403 to €557. The real growth rate was 22.54%. From 2007 to 2010, the nominal 
minimum wage grew by 17.87%, averaging to 5.96% per year. In the same period, the 
purchasing power of the minimum wage rose by 14.21%. From 2011 to 2014, the minimum 
wage grew 6.32% in nominal terms. That translated into a 0.27% loss in real terms in the value 
of the minimum wage. Subsequently, from 2015 to 2017, the minimum wage registered growth 
of 10.30% in nominal terms. On average, it grew around 7.59% per year. The overall increase 
in real terms was 12.02%. 
Apart from the obvious increase in the disposable income of those workers who earn 
the minimum wage, the successive revisions of the minimum wage may have had other 
consequences in the Portuguese economy. In figure 1, the grey bars represent the share of full-
time workers earning the minimum wage. The share of minimum wage earners went from just 
above 10% in 2007 to nearly 25% in 2017 (right axis), which means that close to one-fourth of 
all full-time workers were pushed to the left tail of the wage distribution. These numbers 
highlight the increasing coverage of this policy. 
Figure 2 presents the dispersion of the wage distribution. It shows the evolution of the 
90th/50th, 90th/10th, and 50th/10th percentile ratios during 2007 to 2017. The minimum wage 
always coincides with the 10th percentile of the wage distribution. Its increase contributes to a 
Source: Computed using Pordata and Quadros do Pessoal Dataset. 
Note: The share of full-time workers earning the minimum wage is obtained from the worker-level Quadros de Pessoal  
dataset. All full-time workers (with 40 weekly hours of work) are considered, with the exception of those who report a base 
salary below the minimum wage due to extraordinary employment conditions. 
Figure 1: Evolution of the minimum wage in Portugal, 2007-2017 
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reduction of the 10th percentile-median wage ratio, as shown in Figure 2. Similarly, the increase 
in the minimum wage may have contributed to a reduction of the gap between the bottom 10th 
percentile and the highest wages, depicted by the decline in the 90/10 ratio. These figures point 
to decreasing wage inequality in overall terms (in the entire distribution) and in the left tail of 
the distribution. These dynamics highlight the growing relevance of the minimum wage in the 
Portuguese economy and the importance of studying its effects, as developed in this thesis in 




The analysis conducted for this thesis is based on two main data sets: 
 
(i) The Quadros de Pessoal (QP) data set on worker and firm characteritics, 
collected by the Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) and Direção-Geral de 
Estatística da Educação e Ciência (DGEEC). This database is a census of all 
firms with at least one employed worker (trabalhador por conta de outrém) and 
contains linked information on each worker. The data set includes year-by-year 
information on firm sales, sector, and location. For the same year and firm, it 
also includes information on each worker’s monthly wage, weekly hours 
Source: Computed using the Quadros do Pessoal dataset. 
Note: All full-time workers (with 40 weekly hours of work) are considered, with the exception of those who report a 
base salary below the minimum wage due to extraordinary employment conditions.   




worked, tenure, education, occupation, and gender. It has annual periodicity and 
refers to October of the respective year. 
 
(ii) The Sistema de Contas Integradas das Empresas (SCIE), also provided by INE 
and DGEEC. This database is produced on an annual basis and includes 
companies’ administrative financial information as reported for fiscal and 
accounting purposes. For all companies registered as societies, it provides a 
detailed income statement. For this reason, the analysis is limited to this set of 
firms. The SCIE data set includes information on key indicators used in the 
analysis, including business volume, operating profit (EBIT), labor costs, 
expenses for materials (CMVMC), and sector/industry classifications.  
 
Measures of firm-level employment and wages were computed using worker-level 
Quadros de Pessoal (QP). Average employment was measured by estimating full-time-
equivalent employment (FTE) and wage using the average real wage of the firm’s workers. The 
key independent variable in this analysis—firm exposure to an increase in the minimum wage 
(FE), measured by the share of workers whose salaries are below next year’s new minimum 
wage—was also computed using worker-level QP. Firm-level QP provides other firm-specific 
characteristics, such as firm age, entity type, and geographical location. Worker-level QP is 
collapsed by firm and then linked with firm-level QP. All firms identified in the worker-level 
data set are matched in the firm-level data set. 
The SCIE data set provides important information to control for firm performance and 
characteristics. It is linked with Quadros de Pessoal, using the unique firm identifier variable 
NPC_FIC, and then complemented with firm-level information on imports and exports from 
the Comércio Internacional (CI) data set, which is also collected by INE and DGEEC.   
Some groups of firms or sectors of the economy are not considered in the analysis due 
to data unavailability. That is the case of public institutions and companies employing only 
domestic workers, which are not incorporated in the Quadros de Pessoal data set, and financial 
institutions and nonprofit organizations, which are excluded from the SCIE database. Lastly, 
due to poor data quality, primary activities (agriculture, fishing, and mining) are also dropped 






Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  
      Main Sample   
2008 to 2010 
  
2011 to 2014 
  
2015 to 2017       2008 to 2017       
            
      Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Firm Exposure 0.289 0.369   0.269 0.37   0.302 0.38   0.40 0.411 
FTE Employment 13.198 93.177   10.828 71.925   11.38 87.861   11.86 90.707 
Δ% FTE -0.065 0.424   -0.083 0.45   -0.094 0.447   -0.021 0.416 
Firm Avg. Wage  730.721 357.526   699.989 371.639   740.976 365.861   737.644 363.937 
Δ% Firm Avg. Wage 0.021 0.119   0.035 0.132   0.009 0.118   0.026 0.106 
                            
Womem Share 0.411 0.378   0.41 0.387   0.418 0.384   0.439 0.386 
Labor Share   0.312 0.2   0.306 0.199   0.328 0.21   0.323 0.297 
Wage Share 0.459 0.153   0.457 0.161   0.461 0.156   0.463 0.151 
Revenue     2,250,755 25,300,000   1,662,372 19,100,000   1,757,711 22,700,000   1,926,977 2,230,000 
Profitability  115,151 8,674,030   81,564 2,578,584   100,018 7,923,862   124,334 2,656,490 
                            
Observations   630,664   292,821   352,202   230,827 
Note: The table presents summary statistics for key firm characteristics in the different samples used in the study of firm-level employment and wage effects. All figures are in constant prices 
(2017). 
 8 
The main sample in this analysis is formed by all companies matched in Quadros de 
pessoal and SCIE that were operating in 2006 and 2007. It contains 128.672 firms and 
corresponds to 630.664 observations spread over 2008–17. In Table 1, columns (1) and (2), I 
report the sample mean and standard deviation for some of the firm characteristics. The average 
firm in the sample has approximately 13 full-time workers, pays an average monthly wage of 
€730 (in 2017 prices), and has 29% of its workers directly affected by an increase in the 
minimum wage. Moreover, for the average firm, around 41% of the workforce are women, 
labor costs are approximately 31% of business volume, and wages represent 46% of labor 
costs.2  
4. Empirical Approach 
 
In the first part of the analysis, I estimate the elasticity of employment and wages to 
minim wage changes at the firm level. I establish a relationship between firms’ exposure to the 
minimum wage and changes in employment and wages. Firm exposure (FE) to an increase in 
the minimum wage, the key explanatory variable in the model, is measured by the share of 
workers in the firm whose salaries are below next year’s minimum wage. In other words, FE is 
the fraction of workers in the firm who are directly affected by the new minimum wage.3 I 
closely follow Machin, Manning, and Rahman (2003) and Draca, Machin, and Van Reenen 
(2011) and estimate baseline regression models of the following form:  
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
(1) 
 
where i and t are firm and year indexes, respectively; the dependent variable is the firm’s 
percentage change in outcome y between the year t-1 and t, which takes values between -1 and 
1 (-100% and 100%); FEit-1 is firm exposure to the minimum wage increase in the previous 
year; Xit is a set of controls for firm characteristics and performance which vary flexibly over time.  
 
2 For the study of heterogeneity by sector, I restrict the sample to the listed sectors. Appendix table A1 presents 
summary statistics of that sample. For the study of the incidence of the minimum wage, I restrict the sample to the 
manufacturing sector. Appendix table A2 presents summary statistics of that sample. It comprises 22.711 firms 
and corresponds to 118.210 observations. On average, compared with the full sample, manufacturing firms have 
more full-time employees, 22, and pay a lower average monthly wage of €708. In addition, manufacturing firms 
are on average more exposed to a minimum wage increase, with 34% of their employees directly affected by it. 
For the average manufacturing firm, approximately 36% of its workforce is women.  
3 The expressions ‘firm exposure’ and ‘fraction of workers directly affected by the new minimum wage’ are used 
interchangeably throughout this text. 
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They include firm age, industry, two-year average export share, two-year average profitability 
(EBIT), two-year average labour share (labour costs divided by business volume), two-year 
average share of wage costs in total labour costs, and sector-level two-year average import 
share. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a zero-mean error term. All regressions include year dummies and are weighted by 
the natural logarithm of firms’ FTE employment to avoid overestimation of the employment 
effects caused by small firms. 
The central assumption behind this model is that, in the absence of a minimum wage 
increase, 𝛽𝑡 should not be significantly different from zero. That means there is no reason for 
firms with different levels of exposure to an increase in the minimum wage to behave 
differently, in terms of employment and wages, when the minimum wage does not change 
(ceteris paribus). Although this assumption cannot be tested, the results should support the 
existence of a different behaviour when the minimum wage increases.  
In the second part of the thesis, I am interested in understanding who bears the costs of 
the minimum wage increases. The study of the minimum wage incidence is based on the 
following accounting identity: 
 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑡 ≡ 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡 − 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡 − 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡 − 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 (2) 
 




 =  
𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡
 −  
∆𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑡






If the results show that firms increase wages in response to a higher minimum wage, 
then the increase must be reflected in the evolution of firms’ spending. Firms with higher 
exposure must experience a larger surge in labour costs. Equation (3) explains how firms may 
react to this surge in labour costs. The increase may be supported by firm owners, in which 
case, the variation in profits should offset the variation in labour costs. And/or the costs may be 
passed on to consumers, translating into a bigger margin between revenues and materials. To 
estimate the relations between firms’ exposure to a minimum wage increase and the change in 
labour costs, revenues, materials, and profits, I use an adaptation of the original model in 
equation (1). The variation in outcome y is weighted on the firms’ revenues to make the 




where i and t are firm and time indexes, respectively; and all the variables have the same 
meaning as in the original model in equation (1). The regressions are weighted by the natural 
logarithm of firms’ revenues. 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Employment and Wage Elasticities to Changes in the 
Minimum Wage 
 
The estimates of the employment elasticities (equation 1) are summarized in Table 2, 
panel A. There is a negative relation between firms’ fraction of workers directly affected by an 
increase in the minimum wage and the evolution of employment. In column (1), the estimate 
indicates that firms with a higher share of their labor force directly affected by the minimum 
wage changes had a larger reduction in employment. Column (2) includes 1-digit industry 
effects and column (3) includes instead 2-digit industry effects. Results remain qualitatively 
similar. Note that because of the way in which employment is estimated, these results reflect 
not only the effect of firms’ decisions to dismiss workers (lay-offs), but also that of firms that 
go out of business (closure).  
Table 2, panel B, presents the estimates of the wage elasticity (equation 1). The model 
specifications are the same and in panel B, but in the event of firms closing, the percentage 
change in the average wage cannot be computed. For this reason, the study of wage effects 
comprises only companies that remain operational between year t-1 and t. The results, presented 
in Table 2, panel B, illustrate a positive relation between firms’ share of workers directly 
affected by the minimum wage and the percentage change in the firm-level average wage. In 
column (1), the estimate indicates that firms’ average wage increase was 5.5 pp. With 1-digit 
industry effects (column 2), or 2-digit industry effects (column 3), the estimate is approximately 
the same.  
These findings show that firms that are more exposed to the minimum wage register, on 
average, a more accentuated decline in employment; but also register higher growth in the 
average worker’s wage. 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
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Table 2: Employment and Wage Elasticities 
  
        Main Sample (2008 to 2017)   2008 to 2009   2010 to 2014   2015 to 2017 
              
        (1) (2) (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Panel A: Change in Firm-Level Employment                   
Firm Exposure -0.0309*** -0.0273*** -0.0305***   -0.0398***   -0.0450***   -0.0267*** 
  (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019)   (0.0030)   (0.0026)   (0.0028) 
Average Labor Share -0.2223*** -0.2563*** -0.2824***   -0.3044***   -0.2744***   -0.2592*** 
  (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0039)   (0.0061)   (0.0052)   (0.0060) 
Average Wage Share -0.3037*** -0.3279*** -0.3368***   -0.2862***   -0.3943***   -0.3469*** 
  (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046)   (0.0067)   (0.0063)   (0.0076) 
Observations 630,664 630,664 630,664   292,821   352,202   230,827 
R-Squared 0.0303 0.0371 0.0406   0.0378   0.0436   0.0323 
                    
Panel B: Change in Firm Average wage                   
Firm Exposure 0.0554*** 0.0564*** 0.0595***   0.0655***   0.0581***   0.0571*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)   (0.0009)   (0.0007)   (0.0007) 
Average Labor Share -0.0197*** -0.0233*** -0.0235***   -0.0308***   -0.0192***   -0.0225*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012)   (0.0020)   (0.0016)   (0.0017) 
Average Wage Share -0.0661*** -0.0667*** -0.0665***   -0.0572***   -0.0906***   -0.0361*** 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)   (0.0023)   (0.0021)   (0.0022) 
Observations 575,116 575,116 575,116   262,564   310,489   214,269 
R-Squared 0.0576 0.0583 0.0594   0.0371   0.0624   0.0412 
                    
Panel C: Implicit Elasticity                   
Employment elasticity wrt.  Wage -0.5578 -0.4840 -0.5126   -0.6076   -0.7745   -0.4676       
Number of Firms 128,672 128,672 128,672   153,874   143,312   130,031 
Controls       x x x   x   x   x 
Industry 1-char FE's   x               
Industry 2-digit FE's     x   x   x   x 
Note:***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses bellow the coefficients. The table describes the relation between firms' share of worker earning a salary 
bellow next year's minimum wage (Firm Exposure) and their employment and average wage outcomes. The experiment considers only full-time workers. The employment effect, in Panel A, 
includes both firms' closure and layoffs while wage effects, in Panel B, include only layoffs. Columns 1 to 3 analyze the main sample of firms, formed by all companies operating in 2006 and 
2007 with complete information in the data bases. Columns 4 to 6 analyze period samples formed by all companies operating for at least 2 years before the first year of the respective time 
window and with complete information in the data bases.  In Panel C are reported the respective employment elasticities with respect to the wage. Regressions include year dummies and are 
weighted by the natural logarithm of employment. 
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The wage changes are of greater magnitude than the employment changes to a variation 
in the minimum wage, suggesting that firms respond to the higher minimum wage not only by 
cutting employment, but also by raising wages. The estimates of the employment elasticity with 
respect to wages (average wage), or simply the ratio between the estimated employment and 
wage effects, illustrates this point. These are presented in Table 2, panel C. Overall, the 
employment effects are approximately half as strong as the wage effects, as the elasticity 
estimations range from -0.48 to -0.56. In the benchmark specification, with 2-digit industry 
effects, the implied elasticity is -0.51. 
5.2. Heterogeneity in Employment and Wage 
Elasticities 
  
In this section, I explore the heterogeneity in employment and wage sensitivity to 
changes in the minimum wage across different types of firms. First, I compare firms’ responses 
depending on their size, as larger, more productive firms, might be more resilient. I split the 
sample into two groups, small firms, with fewer than 10 employees, and medium and large 
firms, with 10 or more employees. In the main sample, there are 101.826 small firms and 26.846 
medium and big firms. In Table 3, I show the estimates of the employment and wage effects 
for these two groups of firms. In general, the results indicate that small firms are relatively more 
responsive to increases in the minimum wage, in terms of employment and wages. The 
employment effects are on average 73% more severe in small firms than in medium and large 
firms. The wage effects prove to be 10% stronger in small firms than in medium and large 
firms. This finding is particularly relevant in the Portuguese context where small firms account 
for the lion share of employment. Specifically, in the QP data set from 2007, there are 272.438 
firms in the estimation sample employing at least one full-time worker. Of those, 236.599 (87%) 
are small firms, employing approximately 32% of all full-time employees.  
Second, I examine the heterogeneity in employment and wage elasticities across 
industries, as their reliance on low wage workers differs. I focus on four major sectors: 
manufacturing, retail, hospitality, and transportation. These sectors correspond to sections C, 
G, H, and I of the CAE-Rev.3, respectively.  Table 4 presents the estimates of employment and 
wage elasticities in the four industries. For each industry, I present estimations with and without 
2-digit industry effects. 
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Table 3: Heterogeneous Response in Employment and Wages by Firm Size 
        
        Medium and Big Firms Small Firms         
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Change in Firm-Level Employment           
Firm Exposure   -0,0294*** -0,0187*** -0,0178*** -0,0347*** -0,0338*** -0,0391*** 
        (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) 
Average Labour Share   -0,2136*** -0,2480*** -0,2709*** -0,2352*** -0,2732*** -0,3048*** 
        (0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0046) 
Average Wage Share   -0,1515*** -0,1787*** -0,1870*** -0,3955*** -0,4117*** -0,4211*** 
        (0.0090) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0051) 
Observations   148,649 148,649 148,649 482,015 482,015 482,015 
R-Squared       0.0284 0.0367 0.0413 0.0350 0.0407 0.0444 
Panel B: Change in Firm Average wage           
Firm Exposure   0,0526*** 0,0521*** 0,0560*** 0,0571*** 0,0591*** 0,0608*** 
        (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0045) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Average Labour Share   -0,0149*** -0,0164*** -0,0175*** -0,0230*** -0,0292*** -0,0290*** 
        (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Average Wage Share   -0,0567*** -0,0599*** -0,0607*** -0,0715*** -0,0708*** -0,0704*** 
        (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Observations   140,250 140,250 140,250 434,866 434,866 434,866 
R-Squared   0.0562 0.0569 0.0588 0.0584 0.0594 0.0602 
Panel C: Implicit Elasticitiy             
Employment elasticity 
wrt.  Wage 
  -0.5589 -0.3589 -0.3179 -0.6561 -0.5719 -0.6431   
Number of firms 26,846 26,846 26,846 101,826 101,826 101,826 
Controls       x x x x x x 
Industry 1-char FE's       x     x   
Industry 2-digit FE's     x     x 
Note:***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses bellow the coefficients. The table describes the relation between firms' share of worker earning a salary 
bellow next year's minimum wage (Firm Exposure) and their employment and average wage outcomes. The experiment considers only full-time workers. The employment effect, in Panel 
A, includes both firms' closure and layoffs while wage effects, in Panel B, include only layoffs. Columns 1 to 3 analyze medium/big firms with ten or more full-time employees in 2007. 
While columns 4 to 6 analyze small firms with less than ten full-time employees in 2007. In Panel C are reported the respective employment elasticities with respect to wages. Regressions 




Table 4: Heterogeneous Response in Employment and Wages by Sector 
  
            
          Manufacturing   Retail   Hospitality   Transportation 
          (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
Panel A: Change in Firm-Level Employment                   
Firm Exposure     -0,0211*** -0,0196***   -0,0361*** -0,0397***   -0,0438*** -0,0329*   -0,0244** -0,0231** 
          (0.0038) (0.0042)   (0.0031) (0.0031)   (0.0046) (0.0047)   (0.0046) (0.0101) 
Average Labor Share     -0,2473*** -0,2591***   -0,3131*** -0,3287***   -0,3668*** -0,3964***   -0,2232*** -0,2292*** 
          (0.0068) (0.0071)   (0.0073) (0.0075)   (0.0155) (0.0158)   (0.0202) (0.0202) 
Average Wage Share     -0.3601*** -0.3689***   -0.3088*** -0.3124***   -0.4349*** -0.4485***   -0.1836*** -0.1812*** 
          (0.0107) (0.0107)   (0.0071) (0.0072)   (0.0141) (0.0142)   (0.0198) (0.0199) 
Observations     123,480 123,480   206,239 206,239   62,512 62,512   30,181 30,181 
R-Squared         0.0437 0.0466   0.0360 0.0370   0.0408 0.0429   0.0240 0.0247 
                                
Panel B: Change in Firm-Level Average wage                   
Firm Exposure     0,0501*** 0,0565***   0,0585*** 0,0590***   0,0493*** 0,0507***   0,0565*** 0,0572*** 
          (0.0010) (0.0011)   (0.0009) (0.0009)   (0.0011) (0.0011)   (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Average Labor Share     -0,0238*** -0,0251***   -0,0180*** -0,0174***   -0,0214*** -0,0253***   0,0017*** 0,0015*** 
          (0.0019) (0.0020)   (0.0022) (0.0023)   (0.0045) (0.0045)   (0.0070) (0.0069) 
Average Wage Share     -0,0581*** -0,0573***   -0,0808*** -0,0800***   -0,0360*** -0,0377***   -0.0732*** -0.0719*** 
          (0.0032) (0.0032)   (0.0025) (0.0025)   (0.0044) (0.0045)   (0.0075) (0.0074) 
Observations     114,476 114,476   188,765 188,765   57,261 57,261   27,293 27,293 
R-Squared     0.0711 0.0740   0.0583 0.0585   0.0751 0.0756   0.0435 0.0439 
                                
Panel C: Implicit Elasticity                           
Employment elasticity wrt.  
Wage 
    -0.4212 -0.3469   -0.6171 -0.6729   -0.8884 -0.6489   -0.4319 -0.4038           
Number of Firms     23,825 23,825   41,492 41,492   12,559 12,559   6,278 6,278 
Controls         x x   x x   x x   x x 
Industry 2-digits FE's         x     x     x     x 
Note:***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses bellow the coefficients. The table describes the relation between the firms' share of worker earning a 
salary bellow next year's minimum wage (Firm Exposure) and their employment and average wage outcomes in four different industries. The experiment considers only full-time workers. 
The employment effect, in Panel A, includes both firms' closure and lay-offs while wage effects, in Panel B, include only lay-offs. Regressions include year dummies and are weighted by the 
natural logarithm of employment.  
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The estimated wage elasticities, in Table 4, panel B, are very similar across industries. 
Considering the specification with industry fixed effects, the estimates indicate excess growth 
of the average wage, ranging from 5.1 to 5.9 pp, in firms with more exposure relative to firms 
with less exposure to the minimum wage, with the hospitality sector at the lower bound and the 
retail sector at the upper bound of the range. On employment, in Table 4, panel A, the effects 
vary considerably across industries. The manufacturing sector, in columns (1) and (2), registers 
the lowest employment elasticities. Controlling for industry fixed effects, results point to an 
extra decrease of employment of nearly 2.0 pp. in more exposed firms. By contrast, in column 
(4), the retail sector has the strongest employment elasticity. The estimates point to an extra 
decrease of nearly 4.0 pp. with an increase in exposure. The estimates for the hospitality and 
transportation sectors are -3.3 pp. and -2.3 pp., respectively. 
Given that the wage effects are identical across industries, the heterogeneity in 
employment effects ultimately justifies the discrepancies in the employment elasticities. In 
Table 4, panel C, the employment elasticities with respect to the wage range from -0.35 to -
0.67 across industries. As expected, a highly reliant sector to the minim wage, the retail sector, 
has the highest employment elasticity, while the manufacturing and transportation sectors 
proved to be less responsive to the minimum wage increases, which may be related to these 
sectors typically being more unionized. 
 
5.3. Differentiated Elasticities of Employment in 
Good and Bad times.  
 
The analysis developed in the previous sections examines annual elasticities for 2008–
17. In this section, I analyze separately three subperiods, 2008–09, 2010–14, and 2015–17. The 
main difference between the three subperiods is that the first is a period of growth in gross 
domestic product, while the second subperiod is instead a period of economic crisis, followed 
by an economic recovery in the third period. As firms’ behaviour may change with time or 
according to the economic conjuncture, this thesis estimates and compares the elasticities of 
employment and wages in each of these subperiods. Each subperiod covers at least two 
minimum wage raises, as there were no minimum wage increases only in 2012, 2013, and 2015.  
Although the employment and wage effects estimates are not directly comparable across 
periods, since these depend on the magnitude of the minimum wage change, the relative effect 
(the employment elasticity with respect to wages) is comparable across periods.  
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Table 2, columns (4), (5) and (6), reports the estimates of equation 1 in each of the 
subperiods. The table indicates that the responsiveness of employment to minimum wage 
changes was greater in the crisis period of 2010–14 (column 4) than in the preceding and 
subsequent years (columns 3 and 5). The estimated elasticity for the crisis period is -0.77, 
whereas the estimated elasticity is -0.61 in 2008–09 and -0.47 in 2015–17.  
 
6. The Incidence of the Minimum Wage 
 
In the previous section, I showed that there is a negative relationship between minimum 
wage increases and employment and a positive relationship between minimum wage increases 
and average wages. Moreover, results also indicated that wage responses are nearly twice as 
large as employment responses. This suggests that firms are more likely to respond to an 
increase in the minimum wage by raising the wages of the affected workers than dismissing 
them. Therefore, firms may internalize part of the costs of the higher minimum wage. 
To describe how firms adjust to a higher minimum wage and, ultimately, understand 
who bears the costs of this policy, I proceed by analyzing firm’s various margins of adjustment, 
such as labour costs, revenues, and expenses for materials. 
In this section, the sample is restricted to firms in the manufacturing sector, as complete 
information on labour costs, revenues, expenses for materials, and profits is just available for 
this subset of firms.  
 First, I study the change on firms’ total labour costs associated with the change in 
minimum wage, a measure of the total income distributed to workers. Using equation (1), I 
establish a relationship between firms’ fraction of workers affected by the minimum wage and 
the variation in these costs. The results, presented in Table 5, panel A, point to a clear positive 
relation between the share of workers affected by the minimum wage and the evolution of 
labour costs.  
The surge in firms’ total labour costs is consistent with the finding that wage responses 
are of larger magnitude than employment responses. It also confirms the hypothesis that firms 
raise wages and, consequently, internalize some of the costs of the higher minimum wage. 
Additionally, these results indicate that the total income distributed to workers increases (labour 
costs include wage and non-wage compensations. The overall positive impact on labour costs 
means that the possible reduction in non-wage compensation does not offset the income gains 
caused by the increase in the minimum wage.  
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Next, I study the response of revenues. In Table 5, panel B, I analyze the relation 
between firms’ fraction of workers affected by the minimum wage and changes in revenues. As 
in the analysis of the employment effects (in section 5.1), these estimates reflect the cases in 
which firms go out of business. In those cases, the variation in revenues is assumed to be -1 (-
100%).  
Results point to a negative relation between firm exposure to the minimum wage and 
the evolution of revenues. However, it is possible that the country’s economic conjuncture 
during these years caused an overestimation of the negative effects of the minimum wage on 
revenues through firm death. For this reason, in panel C, I estimate the revenue effects without 
firm closures. The new estimates point to a small positive response of firms’ revenues. This 
positive relationship is especially strong in 2008–09, with an estimated effect of 1.79 pp. (s.e. 
0.44%). For the remaining periods, 2010–14 and 2015–17, there is no discernible association 
between changes in the minimum wage and firm revenues. The estimates are close to zero and 
statistically insignificant, suggesting a different behaviour of firms. 
Finally, in Table 5 panel D, I present the estimates of the association between firms’ 
fraction of workers affected by the minimum wage and the variation in expenses for materials. 
These expenses represent the inventory value sold by firms and, consequently, they are a proxy 
for the quantities sold. Overall, the results show a small negative relation between firm exposure 
to the minimum wage and expenses for materials. In the benchmark regression, expenses for 
materials in firms with the totality of their workforce affected by the higher minimum wage fell 
by 0.23 pp. (s.e. 0.37%) more than in firms without affected workers (the estimate is statistically 
insignificant). Nonetheless, for 2008–09, there is a clear positive impact on materials; the 
estimate is 0.021 pp. (s.e. 0.6%).  And in 2010–14 and 2015–17, the relation is negative. The 
estimates are -0.14 pp. and -0.12 pp., respectively. As in the effects on revenues, firms appear 
to have changed the way they react to an increase in the minimum wage after 2008–09. 
The estimates of the incidence of the minimum wage are presented in Table 6. In panel 
A, the results confirm the positive relationship between firm exposure to the minimum wage 
and the evolution of labour costs. The estimates indicate an excess surge in labour costs ranging 
from 1.12 to 1.14 pp in firms with all their workers affected by the minimum wage, relative to 
firms without affected workers. In panel B, I present the estimated effects on revenues, which 





Table 5: Effects on Firms' Labour Costs, Revenues and Materials 
  





2017       2008 to 2017 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Change in Firm Total Labour Costs       
Firm Exposure 0.0324*** 0.0344*** 0.0376*** 0.0300*** 0.0292*** 
      (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0034) 
Observations 109,743 109,743 46,158 54,498 36,959 
R-Squared     0.0593 0.0645 0.0592 0.0750 0.0601 
Implicit Elasticity wrt Avg. L. 
Costs 0.7133 0.7288 0.7259 0.7246 0.5748 
                





0.0095*** -0.0047 -0.0222*** -0.0148*** 
      (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0060) (0.0055) (0.0056) 
Observations 118,210 118,210 50,666 59,746 39,021 
R-Squared 0.0332 0.0378 0.0316 0.0304 0.0207 
Implicit Elasticity wrt Avg. L. 
Costs -0.3667 -0.2013 -0.0907 -0.5362 -0.2913 
                
Panel C: Change in Firm Revenue (only lay-
offs)         
Firm Exposure 0.0016 0.0062*** 0.0179*** 0.0030 -0.0027 
      (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0042) 
Observations 109,743 109,743 46,158 54,498 36,959 
R-Squared 0.0332 0.0378 0.0406 0.0468 0.0177 
Implicit Elasticity wrt Avg. L. 
Costs -0.3667 -0.2013 0.3456 0.0725 -0.0531 
            
Panel D: Change in Firm Materials 
(CMVMC)         
Firm Exposure -0.0068* -0.0023 0.0214*** -0.0138*** -0.0122** 
      (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0057) 
Observations 109,743 109,743 46,158 54,498 36,959 
R-Squared 0.0250 0.0274 0.0356 0.0190 0.0155 
Implicit Elasticity wrt Avg. 
Labour Cost -0.1511 -0.0487 0.4131 -0.3333 -0.0240 
            
Number of Firms 22,711 22,711 26,412 23,170 19,976 
Contols     x x x x x 
Industry 2-dig FE's   x x x x 
Note:***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses bellow the coefficients. The table 
describes the relation between firms' share of worker bellow the next minimum wage (Firm Exposure) and their evolution 
in Total Labour Costs, Revenues and Expenses in Materials. The Revenue effect in panel B includes both firms' closure 
and lay-offs. Only firms in the manufacturing sector are considered. Columns 1 and 2 analyze the main sample of firms, 
formed by all companies operating in 2006 and 2007 and with complete information in the data bases. Columns 3 to 5 
analyze period samples formed by all companies operating for at least 2 years before the first year of the respective time 
window and with complete information in the data bases. Regressions include year dummies and are weighted by the 
natural logarithm of revenues. 
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And in panel C, I show the impact on expenses for materials. Both specifications have 
statistically insignificant estimates and depict a small negative change of expenses for materials. 
The effects on firm profits4 are reported in Table 6, panel D. The results point to a significant 
and negative relation between firm exposure to a minimum wage increase and the variation in 
profits.Next, in Table 6 panel E, I report the incidence of changes in the minimum wage on 
consumers, which is given by the margin between the effects on revenues and materials. Both 
specifications show a small positive incidence on consumers, suggesting that part of the costs 
of the higher minimum wage are passed on to them. To understand how the costs are shared 
between firm owners and consumers, I compare the incidence on each of these groups with the 
effect on firms’ labour costs. The fraction paid by consumers is the ratio between the incidence 
on consumers and the effects on labour costs (panel F). My estimations indicate that consumers 
pay between 27% and 56% of the minimum wage costs. The share paid by firm owners, or 
simply the ratio between the effect on profits and the effect on labour costs, is shown in panel 
G. The incidence on firm owners’ ranges from 77% to 100%. The shares for consumers and 
firm owners do not sum to 100%, but both specifications indicate that the bulk of the minimum 
wage costs are financed by firm owners.  
In Table 6, columns (3) to (5), I examine how the incidence of the minimum wage varies 
over time. The effect on labour costs is homogeneous across periods, but firms’ adjustment to 
this surge in costs appears to be different in 2008–09 relative to the subsequent periods. In 
2008–09, there is a significant positive association with changes in revenues (1.79 pp; s.e. 0.6%) 
and materials (0.85 pp; s.e. 0.3%), which means the incidence on consumers is 0.0094 and the 
share paid by them is around 98%. Moreover, the response in terms of profits is small and 
statistically insignificant (-0.09 pp; s.e. 0.25%). Thus, the share paid by firm owners is 9%. For 
2010–14 and 2015–17, the responses of revenues and materials are small and insignificant. 
However, the estimated adjustment of profits is negative and statistically significant. My 
estimations indicate that the share paid by firm owners is 91% and 100% in 2010–14 and 2015–
17, respectively. 
7. Robustness Checks and Threats to Identification 
 
In the previous sections, I showed the robustness of my results to controlling for more 
disaggregated industry fixed effects. In this section, I examine the robustness of the results 
 
4 Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). 
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Table 6: Incidence of the Minimum Wage 
  





2017       2008 to 2017 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Change in Firm Total Labour 
Costs         
Firm Exposure 0.0112*** 0.0114*** 0.0096*** 0.0118*** 0.0084*** 
      (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
                
Panel B: Change in Firm Revenue         
Firm Exposure 0.0016 0.0062*** 0.0179*** 0.0030 -0.0027 
      (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0060) (0.0039) (0.0042) 
                
Panel C: Change in Materials         
Firm Exposure -0.0014 -0.0002 0.0085*** -0.0050 -0.0033 
      (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
            
Panel D: Change in 
Profits           
Firm Exposure   -0,0115*** 
-
0,0088*** -0.0009 -0.0107*** -0.0085*** 
      (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
            
Panel E: Incidence on Consumers         
Panel B - Panel C 0.003 0.0064 0.0094 0.008 0.0006 
                
Panel F: Fraction paid by consumers         
Panel E / Panel A 26.79% 56.14% 97.92% 67.80% 7.14% 
                
Panel G: Fraction paid by Firm-
Owners         
Panel D / Panel A 102.68% 77.19% 9.38% 90.68% 101.19% 
                
Number of Firms 22,711 27,111 26,412 23,170 19,976 
Contols     x x x x x 
Industry 2-dig FE's   x x x x 
Note:***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses bellow the coefficients. The table 
describes the relation between firms' share of worker bellow next year's minimum wage (Firm Exposure) and their 
evolution in Total Labour Costs, Revenues, Expenses in Materials and Profits (all relative to Revenues). The Revenue 
effect includes both firms' closure and lay-offs. Only firms in the manufacturing sector are considered. Columns 1 to 3 
analyze the main sample of firms, formed by all companies operating in 2006 and 2007 and with complete information in 
the data bases. Columns 3 to 5 analyze period samples formed by all companies operating for at least 2 years before the 
first year of the respective time window and with complete information in the data bases. The regressions include year 
dummies and are weighted by the natural logarithm of revenues. 
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with an alternative measure of exposure to the minimum wage and specifications. Results are 
presented in Appendix Tables A4 and A5 and summarized here.  
One potential concern with the measure of exposure to the minimum wage used in this 
thesis is that it might respond endogenously to the minim wage change. While the use the share 
computed based on employment levels in the year prior to the year minimum wage change 
limits this issue, I tested this further by considering two alternative measures of firm exposure. 
Table A5 presents the results. First, I consider a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms whose 
exposure is different from 0, and 0 for firms whose the share of affected workers is 0 (columns 
(1) to (6)). Second, I consider an alternative measure: a dummy variable which is equal to one 
if the firm has a share of the workforce exposed above the 75th percentile of the distribution and 
zero otherwise5 (columns (7) to (12)). Reassuringly, the implicit employment elasticities are 
similar in the different specification and periods using these alternative measures than to those 
obtained using my original measure of exposure.  
While my analysis controls for firm characteristics, it does not account for 
compositional effects that may arise from workers switching across firms. In this section, I 
exploit the longitudinal nature of the Portuguese data to account for these effects by including 
firm fixed effects. In this case, the estimated coefficients of the baseline model are only based 
on changes within the firms. Appendix Table A5 presented the results. It reveals that the 
estimates have the same direction and effects are significant as in the original specification. 
Yet, they differ in terms of magnitude, with higher implied employment elasticities than in the 
original model, especially if firm exposure is considered as a continuous variable (left panel). 
If I consider firm exposure as a dummy variable which is one if the firm has a share of affected 
workers above the 75th percentile of the distribution and zero otherwise (right panel) results are 
somewhat similar to those in the original model.  
When studying the effects of the minimum wage on employment, one obvious 
limitation is the strong regulation of labor markets which restricts lay-offs. The short-run 
employment effects might be larger, and more immediate, in more flexible labor markers. The 
model in this thesis assumes that firms are able to react to the minimum wage in the short-term. 
But if these restrictions are very binding, it is possible that the effects of the minimum wage on 
employment are only observed in the medium term. And therefore, it is possible that there is a 
lagged effect. Moreover, my analysis covers only full-time workers and therefore it does not 
account for any possible substitution between full and part-time labor. 
 
5 I also analyzed results using a definition of high share as being above or below the median of the share distribution 




In this thesis, I have shown that increasing the minimum wage has consequences for 
firm-level employment and wages. More exposed firms register, on average, a more 
accentuated decline in employment, but also higher growth in the average worker’s wage. In 
line with Harasztosi and Lindner (2019), my results show that the wage elasticities are of a 
larger magnitude than employment elasticities, indicating that firms are more likely to respond 
to the minimum wage increase by raising wages than dismissing workers. My estimates point 
to employment elasticities with respect to average wages ranging from -0.48 to -0.56. I also 
found that these elasticities vary considerably across industries. The manufacturing and 
transportation sectors proved to be less responsive to the minimum wage increases, which may 
be related to these sectors typically being more unionized. Moreover, my results suggest that 
the elasticity of employment is not constant over time. Raising the minimum wage is associated 
with a larger employment reduction during the crisis period (2010–14), with an estimated 
elasticity of -0.77, followed by 2008–09, with an elasticity of -0.61, and 2015–17, with an 
elasticity of -0.47.  
In this thesis, I also studied the incidence of the minimum wage. I analyzed firms’ response 
in various accounting margins, to understand whether the costs of this policy are supported by 
firm owners (through reduction of profits) and/or by consumers (reflecting in a larger margin 
between revenues and expenses for materials). during the period of positive growth (2008–09), 
the increase in the margin between revenues and materials suggests that most of the costs of the 
minimum wage increases were borne by consumers. In the subsequent crisis period, the 
majority of the minimum wage costs was borne by firm owners, and this occurred because they 
suffer a decrease in profits that offset the increase in labor costs caused by the higher minimum 
wage. During that period, the lion share of the increased cost of labor was covered by lower 
profits, while the remaining was paid by consumers in the form of higher revenue. 
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Table A1: Summary Statistics Sector Samples 
  





Transportation Hospitality           
          
      Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Firm Exposure 0.27 0.365   0.335 0.362   0.215 0.366 0.426 0.411 
FTE Employment 9.835 121.502   21.893 66.349   14.467 68.338 10.013 57.947 
Δ% FTE -0.064 0.407   -0.057 0.389   -0.058 0.436 -0.056 0.432 
Firm Average Wage  758.643 362.354   708.467 260.334   695.729 297.258 602.394 157.349 
Δ% Firm Average 
Wage 0.02 0.121   0.023 0.102   0.015 0.118 0.023 0.099 
                          
Womem Share 0.41 0.367   0.363 0.334   0.112 0.219 0.612 0.313 
Average Labour 
Share   0.199 0.152   0.351 0.196   0.33 0.166 0.319 0.135 
Average Wage Share 0.461 0.154   0.463 0.134   0.449 0.17 0.501 0.155 
Revenue     2,983,976 36,600,000   3,225,227 22,500,000   2,088,645 13,700,000 587,979 3,380,591 
Profitability  41,084 868,516   84,728 2,079,721   59,581 2,623,436 2,791 597,580 
                          
Observations   206,239   123,480   30,181 62,512 
Note: The table presents summary statistics for key firm characteristics. All figures are in constant prices (2017). 
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Table A2: Summary Statistics Incidence Samples 
  




2010-2014   2015-2017 
            
      Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
      1 2   3 4   5 6   7 8 
Firm Exposure 0.332 0.362   0.309 0.359   0.345 0.369   0.424 0.385 
FTE Employment 22.18 67.462   19.015 59.144   19.85 61.032   21.35 62.026 
Δ% FTE Employment -0.056 0.389   -0.087 0.412   -0.062 0.415   -0.007 0.388 
Firm Average Wage  706.866 260.334   673.09 250.142   709.671 254.513   712.316 250.685 
Δ% Firm Average Wage 0.022 0.102   0.035 0.111   0.01 0.095   0.028 0.087 
                        
Women Share 0.359 0.334   0.364 0.346   0.36 0.341   0.366 0.347 
Average Labor Share 0.342 0.196   0.336 0.19   0.354 0.201   0.342 0.204 
Average Wage Share 0.463 0.134   0.46 0.141   0.465 0.138   0.47 0.134 
Revenue 3,225,227 22,500,000   2,715,044 21,100,000   2,906,225 21,200,000   3,339,065 21,300,000 
Profitability  159,186 2,507,808   114,305 1,651,985   115,672 2,470,571   223,416 3,364,548 
                        
Δ% Revenue -0.074 0.36   -0.036 0.267   0.009 0.367   0.048 0.241 
Δ% Labor Costs 0.016 0.194   0.015 0.21   0.008 0.2   0.058 0.192 
Δ% Materials 0.012 0.301   -0.041 0.348   0.041 0.349   0.053 0.342 
Δ% Labor Costs (relative to Revenue) -0.002 0.088   -0.002 0.087   -0.004 0.088   0.013 0.078 
Δ% Materials (relative to Revenue) -0.001 0.201   -0.002 0.179   0.012 0.178   0.019 0.156 
Δ% Profitability (relative to Revenue) -0.001 0.16   -0.009 0.151   -0.001 0.17   0.01 0.149 
                            
Observations 118,210   50,666   59,746   39,021 
Note The table presents summary statistics for the samples used in the study of the minimum wage incidence. Only firms in the manufacturing sector are considered. All values are in constant 
prices (2017). 
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Table A3: Effects on Average Labour Costs 
  
        Main Sample (2008 to 2017) 2008 to 2010 2011 to 2014 2015 to 2017 
        
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Change in Firm Average 
Labour Costs             
Firm Exposure   0.0450*** 0.0472*** 0.0486*** 0.0518*** 0.0414*** 0.0508*** 
        (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Average Labour Share   -0.0331*** -0.0417*** -0.0412*** -0.0393*** -0.0415*** -0.0504*** 
        (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0041) 
Average Wage Share   0.4428*** 0.4523*** 0.4571*** 0.4308*** 0.5295*** 0.4350*** 
        (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0049) 
Observations   575,116 575,116 575,116 262,564 310,489 214,269 
R-Squared       0.0476 0.0490 0.0498 0.0456 0.0580 0.0469 
                    
Panel B: Implicit Elasticitiy               
Employment elasticity wrt. 
Labour Costs 
  -0.6867 -0.5784 -0.6276 -0.7683 -1.0870 -0.5256 
  
Number of Firms 128,672 128,672 128,672 153,874 143,312 130,031 
Contols       x x x x x x 
Industry 1-char FE's   x         
Industry 2-digit FE's     x x x x 
Note:***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses bellow the coefficients. The table describes the relation between firms' share of worker earning a salary 
bellow next year's minimum wage (Firm Exposure) and their evolution on average labour costs (labour costs per full-time employee).  Columns 1 to 3 analyse the main sample of firms, 
formed by all companies operating in 2006 and 2007 with complete information in the data bases. Columns 4 to 6 analyse period samples formed by all companies operating for at least 2 
years before the first year of the respective time window and with complete information in the data bases.  In Panel B are reported the respective employment elasticities with respect to the 
average labour costs. Regressions include year dummies and are weighted by the natural logarithm of employment.  
 
 
Table A4: Robustness of Employment and Wage Elasticities to Alternative Measure of Exposure   
                              
      
Exposure variable: =1 if share of workers in the firms whose 
salaries are below next years minimum wage >0 
Exposure variable: =1 if share of workers in the firms whose 
salaries are below next years minimum wage is in top 75th 
percentile 













      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A: Change in Firm-Level 
Employment 
    






































  (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0019) 
Observations 630,664 630,664 630,664 292,821 352,202 230,827 630,664 630,664 630,664 292,821 352,202 230,827 
R-Squared 0.0303 0.0369 0.0405 0.0376 0.0434 0.0321 0.0303 0.0370 0.0406 0.0376 0.0431 0.0325 
Panel B: Change in Firm Average 
wage 
    


























  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Observations 575,116 575,116 575,116 262,564 310,489 214,269 575,116 575,116 575,116 262,564 310,489 214,269 
R-Squared 0.0487 0.0512 0.0519 0.0295 0.0558 0.0310 0.0487 0.0491 0.0496 0.0288 0.0532 0.0248 
Panel C: Implicit Elasticitiy                             
Employment elasticity wrt.  Wage -0.5462 -0.4942 -0.5292 -0.6436 -0.8179 -0.4540 -0.7019 -0.5925 -0.6554 -0.6736 -0.7643 -0.6436 
Number of Firms 128,672 128,672 128,672 153,874 143,312 130,031 128,672 128,672 128,672 153,874 143,312 130,031 
Contols     x x x x x x x x x x x x 
Industry 1-char FE’s   x           x         
Industry 2-digit FE’s       x x x x     x x x x 
Note:***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses bellow the coefficients. The table describes the relation between firms' share of worker earning a salary 
bellow next year's minimum wage (Firm Exposure) and their employment and average wage outcomes. The employment effect, in Panel A, includes both firms' closure and layoffs while 
wage effects, in Panel B, include only layoffs. In Panel C are reported the respective employment elasticities with respect to the wage. Regressions include year dummies and are weighted by 
the natural logarithm of employment. In the left panel, firm exposure is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm has a share of the workforce exposed above the 75th percentile of 
the distribution and zero otherwise. And in the right panel, firm exposure is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms whose exposure is different from 0, and 0 for forms for firms where the 




Table A5: Employment and Wage Elasticities with Firm-Fixed Effects 
  
        2008-2017 2008-2009 2010-2014 2015-2017 2008-2017 2008-2009 2010-2014 2015-2017 
        
        (4) (6) (8) (10) (4) (6) (8) (10) 
Panel A: Change in Firm-Level Employment               
Firm Exposure -0.0985*** -0.1978*** -0.1111*** -0.1374*** -0.0396*** -0.0509*** -0.0404*** -0.0501*** 
  (0.0034) (0.0091) (0.0058) (0.0081) (0.0032) (0.0056) (0.0037) (0.0049) 
Observations 630,664 352,202 630,664 630,664 630,664 352,202 630,664 630,664 
R-Squared 0.0145 0.0011 0.0093 0.0076 0.0130 0.0010 0.0083 0.0067 
                        
Panel B: Change in Firm Average wage               
Firm Exposure 0.1261*** 0.2718*** 0.1491*** 0.1890*** 0.0580*** 0.1055*** 0.0666*** 0.0867*** 
  (0.0011) (0.0035) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0024) 
Observations 575,116 575,116 575,116 575,116 575,116 575,116 575,116 575,116 
R-Squared 0.0394 0.0033 0.0453 0.0093 0.0364 0.0005 0.0389 0.0109 
                        
Panel C: Implicit Elasticity                       
Employment elasticity wrt.  Wage -0.7811 -0.7277 -0.7451 -0.7270 -0.6828 -0.4825 -0.6066 -0.5779 
Number of Firms 128,672 153,874 143,312 130,031 128,672 153,874 143,312 130,031 
Controls       x x x x x x x x 
Firm Fixed-Effects x x x x x x x x 
Note:***p<0,01, **p<0,05, *p<0,1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses bellow the coefficients. The table describes the relation between firms' share of worker earning a salary 
bellow next year's minimum wage (Firm Exposure) and their employment and average wage outcomes. The experiment considers only full-time workers. The employment effect, in Panel A, 
includes both firms' closure and layoffs while wage effects, in Panel B, include only layoffs. In the left panel, firm exposure is a continuous variable like in the original model. And in the right 
panel firm exposure is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the firm has a share of the workforce exposed above the 75th percentile of the distribution and zero otherwise. .In Panel C are 
reported the respective employment elasticities with respect to the wage. Regressions include year dummies and are weighted by the natural logarithm of employment. 
